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R ECENTLY Colonial Airlines attempted for a period of several
months to prevent the United States Government from imple-
menting an air transport agreement with Canada. Colonial finally
terminated its court action against the Government and the matter was
closed. Actually, however, the withdrawal of the case from the docket
of the United States Supreme Court did not answer any of the basic
issues which could be summarized under the heading of the mutual
responsibility of government and business with regard to the inter-
national position of the United States. Americans generally feel that
the political officials in Washington carry the burden of formulation
and implementation of our foreign policy, but in these times of con-
stant crisis the requirements of national self-preservation demand that
every private citizen, every business executive as well as every govern-
ment official consider the implications of his actions as they affect our
relations with other states.
The thesis that businessmen should be responsible for guaranteeing
the consonance of their business activity with national foreign policy
often has been overworked by those who imagine businessmen under
a special obligation for virtuous behavior in order to justify their in-
fluential position within our culture. There have been times when the
business community could not discover what the foreign policy was in
a given area of activity because in fact we had no definite policy for
that segment of our relations with other states. There have been other
times when conflicting viewpoints in high government places produced
situations in which any business action might later be judged as in-
correct and contrary to the interests of the United States. In brief
even omnipotence could not be a universal guarantee of business
activity in strict accord with the specific policies of the government at
a given time. While foreign policy is in the formulation stage, busi-
ness is certainly entitled to be heard and to press its position with
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vigor (which happens frequently), but once decisions have been taken
it becomes essential for all citizens corporate and otherwise to fall in
line. This does not mean that undesirable policies must be accepted
passively without murmur: there are recognized and accepted proced-
ures for repealing laws and reversing administrative courses of action
undertaken by the government. The major point is simply that we can
no longer avoid the luxury of private sabotage of public policy. We
must maintain maximum strength not only to restrain our enemies
but also to impress our friends and consequently we cannot indulge
in irresponsible actions running counter to official policies because
such actions can create abroad only the impression of internal dissen-
tion and uncertainty. At a time when our national existence may be
threatened, it becomes the self-interest of each individual not to under-
cut the foreign policies of the government. All this exhortation will
not, however, prevent any company from protesting strenuously when
it is hurt by government action. It would be foolish to expect either
man or corporation not to contest a public step which seemed to
threaten existence itself. The Colonial Airlines affair is a case in point.
NETWORK OF BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS
The international air transport route structure established since
the end of World War II rests upon a network of bilateral agreements
which spell out in detail the actual routes and privileges exchanged
between each state and all the others. Under the existing international
law of the air, every state controls the airspace above its territory and
thus is able to deny passage to alien aircraft until a satisfactory agree-
ment has been reached. This situation produced many cases of inter-
national extortion during the Long Armistice but recently most nations
have been willing to grant commercial aviation privileges without un-
due restraint. The privileges conferred may range from the simple
rights of free passage and transit stop to the opportunity to pick up
and discharge passengers traveling to or from any other country. Some
states like Canada preferred to limit the passengers handled by a for-
eign airline operating in Canadian territory to those either coming
from or going to the country of the foreign airline's origin. In other
words, under this arrangement the air carriers of one state cannot pick
up passengers in a second state and carry them to a third, nor can they
transport people from any third state to the second. The effect is to
place a severe handicap upon any airline operating over long distances
through many countries. Widespread application of this kind of
privilege exchange would make it practically impossible from a finan-
cial viewpoint for United States international carriers to operate their
globe-circling routes, and consequently we have a vested interest in
securing through our bilateral agreements the fuller privileges of
carrying passengers from one foreign state to another. This explains
. in brief our constant activity since 1944 to obtain the widest privileges
from. as many states as possible.
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The process of bilateral negotiation for air transport rights rests
upon national sovereignty over airspace and this in turn confers an
equality of bargaining power upon the participants. The smallest
state can and does expect to receive the same privileges it grants to
any other state. The acceptance of less would indicate inferiority and
no diplomat in today's nationalistic world can bring a suggestion of
subordinate status to the people at home. Quid pro quo then is the
basis of international air transport rights. If we expect to fly to and
through another country, we must be willing to permit the airlines
of that country to fly to and through the United States. Some observ-
ers, pointing out the excessive competition which could result if
every country utilized its privileges, argue that our government should
demand a unilateral grant of privileges and enforce such non-reciprocity
by the use of economic pressures of various sorts. Another group,
likewise seeking to reduce the competition facing our international
carriers, suggests.that recipients of economic aid from the United States
should not be permitted to engage in subsidized international air
transportation - and all such transportation is subsidized at present -
because otherwise we are helping foreigners to take business away from
our own airlines which consequently require more support from the
public treasury. Both of these opinions are rooted in the belief that
the United States should take whatever steps may be necessary to secure
for its businessmen a share of this international industry in a propor-
tion which would not be granted willingly by other sovereign states.
Two arguments against such a policy are apparent immediately. In
the first place, the United States declares itself to be the champion
of economic competition within a profit system. One of the sacred
books in our economic bible describes the way in which excessive com-
petition will sooner or later be checked by the cruel law of loss and
bankruptcy, and how could we expect others to accept the faith when
we label it as unworkable internationally by trying to reduce competi-
tion through political and economic pressures beyond the scope of
aviation? Secondly, the United States, being accused constantly of
economic imperialism, must never give evidence to support the charge.
Whether we like it or not, there is no doubt that' much of the world
suspects us of harboring intentions to dominate the .economic life of
the world for our own ends. This suspicion is constantly fed by
Soviet propaganda. It would appear therefore, that the United States
simply cannot afford to alienate friends and antagonize onlookers by
pressuring other countries into accepting superior transport privileges
for our commercial aircraft. Respect for the equality of bargaining
position between states then seems to be forced upon us by the very
nature of the position in which we find ourselves, if nothing else.
UNITED STATES-CANADIAN AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT OF JUNE 4, 1949
When-Newfoundland officially became part of Canada in 1949, the
Canadian Government acquired jurisdiction over the Newfoundland
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airspace. This meant that the Canadians by gaining control of the
air over the field at Gander, an important stop on the transatlantic
route, gained new bargaining power. This led to a suggestion that
the United States should renegotiate its bilateral air agreement with
Canada; in fact, the Canadian Government stated its intentions to
cancel our Gander privileges in the absence of a new agreement. Our
delegation, headed by C.A.B. member Russell B. Adams, concluded a
new agreement with the Canadians on June 4, 1949. This document
included the usual exchange of trans-border routes between adjacent
countries and provided, moreover, for a liberalization of the Canadian
position toward the carriage of Canadian passengers by United States
airlines to and from third countries. In view of our overall policy
regarding international air transport, this change in Canada's attitude
was both gratifying and encouraging. The improvement in our
neighbor's bargaining position did not produce a deterioration in our
international position, but one of the concessions caused considerable
difficulty.
The Canadians requested and received the privilege of operating
from Montreal which is one of their major traffic-generating centers to
New York City which is obviously one of the greatest traffic points of
the world. It does not seem unreasonable for a neighboring state to
wish to fly'the busiest route between the two countries, but in this case
the fact that Colonial Airlines pioneered the route, in 1928 and has
been flying it since that time produced serious complications. Colonial's
management decided that non-stop competition by Trans-Canada
would be little short of ruinous; in fact Colonial soon released data
purporting to show that the carrier would lose one million dollars
annually which meant an increase in its subsidy requirements by that
amount or financial ruin. Colonial chose the financial ruin theme
and declared publicly that the Department of State and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board conspired and then secretly bartered away the life blood
of American business, i.e., its hitherto non-competitive route to
Montreal.
Talk started about the undemocratic and unconstitutional nature
of the kind of executive agreement by which the exchange of privileges
had been effected.1 Congress was approached: the Senate Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee which was investigating the airline
industry at the time listened to Sigmund Janas, President of Colonial
Airlines, explain, his grievances. Later, when it became obvious that
no action would be taken by the committee, many senators tradition-
ally uneasy over the use of executive agreements and always willing to
wear the United States flag over patriotic shoulders signed a letter of
protest to the President:
1 Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transporta-
tion, 17 J. of Air L. & Com. 436 (1950) and 18 J. of Air L. & Com. 12 (1951).






The recently concluded Air Transport Agreement between the
United States and Canada has resulted in such serious damage to
United States air carriers, one airline especially, and to the general
interest of our country that we, the undersigned members of the
United States Senate, are prompted to call the matter to your
attention.
It is our feeling that there are inherent faults in the procedures
whereby agreements pertaining to air transport operations are en-
tered into by executive agencies without ratification, or even con-
sultation, by the Senate. The United States-Canada Agreement is
a flagrant example of how this procedure can result in unjust and
unsound discrimination against United States companies, their
employees and stockholders.
Testimony before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee on June 8th has established that the exchange of rights
between the two countries has resulted in the granting of very sub-
stantial rights to Canada in return for rights which are of little or
no value to the United States. An inevitable result of this action
will be a considerably increased subsidy burden on the Treasury of
the United States.
Furthermore, the testimony discloses that negotiations. leading
to the agreement were conducted in secrecy and in such a way that
United States carriers were deprived of valuable property and other
rights without opportunity to be heard.
Apparently the executive agencies which perpetrated this agree-
ment pursued the same line of thinking which led the Economic
Cooperation Administration to allocate almost $50 million for direct
subsidy of certain foreign airlines which are in competition with
the United States air carriers.
We respectfully invite your attention to this matter and request
that you take the necessary steps to assure that the agreement is
not implemented until such time as a method has been devised to
remedy damage to United States air carriers.
Respectfully,.
(Senators signing this letter)
Democrats: 23-Byrd, Chavez, Ellender, Humphrey, Johnson,
Johnson, Johnston, Kefauver, Kerr, Kilgore, McCarran, McClel-
lan, McMahon, Magnuson, Maybank, Miller, Murray, Myers,
Neely, O'Conor, Pepper, Sparkman, Taylor.
Republicans: 26-Aiken, Baldwin, Brewster, Bridges, Butler, Cain,
Capehart, Cardon, Ecton, Flanders, Hendrickson, Ives, Jenner,
Kem, Langer, McCarthy, Malone, Martin, Mundt, Reed, Schoep-
pel, Taft, Thye, Tobey, Wherry, Young.
It is important to note that the letter did not suggest setting aside the
Agreement but proposed delay in implementation until United States
air carriers had been compensated for their damages. Congressional
interest in this matter, however, failed to produce any remedial action;
the Government continued taking the steps legally necessary to permit
the inauguration of service to New York by Trans-Canada.
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COLONIAL SEEKS JUDICIAL PROTECTION
The Civil Aeronautics Board went through the necessary motions
to grant the Canadian airline a certificate for operation from Montreal
to New York, but before they were completed, Colonial took the whole
case to court to protect its position by judicial means if possible. Two
weeks before the Board began its hearing at the end of August 1949
to determine the fitness of Trans-Canada in accordance with section
402 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,2 Colonial entered Federal District
Court to prevent the hearing by injunction or failing that to stop the
Board from submitting its decision to the President for his approval
and then granting the foreign air carrier permit. The hearing was not
enjoined by the Court, but the issuance of the permit was prohibited
until the constitutional issues raised by Colonial were settled in the
courts of the United States. The constitutionality of sections 402b
and 801 of the Civil Aeronautics Act was questioned, in effect, Colonial
was challenging the whole executive agreement procedure by which
the executive branch of the Government exchanged air transport
privileges with other countries without any participation by Congress
either in consultation or by the formal process of treaty procedure. A
private corporation thus prevented the United 'States from carrying
out the obligations it had assumed in negotiation with another sover-
eign state. A judicial procedure designed to preserve domestic justice
checked movement in international relations.
A statutory three-judge court of the United States District Court
announced the first decision in this case on November 16, 1949 in the
District of Columbia. Two of the three judges upheld the disputed
sections of the Civil Aeronautics Act as being a constitutional delega-
tion of power to the executive branch. The dissenting voice of Judge
T. Alan Goldsborough was not sufficient to protect Colonial's claim;
the airline lost the first judicial battle but it made immediately clear
its intention to exhaust the last remedy by appealing the case to the
Supreme Court.
The obvious display of Colonial Airlines intent to delay if not
prevent competition by Trans-Canada on the Montreal-New York
route created justifiable dissatisfaction on the part of the Canadians.
They had negotiated in good faith, they had met the requirements of
the Civil Aeronautics Board for operation into the United States, they
were able to provide service, but they were kept waiting at the border
by the very company which flew several flights in and out of Montreal
every day. What good was the word of the United States? Few people
outside Government circles were much worried over Canadian thought
on this problem; the matter so far as the United States was concerned
rested in the judiciary where time and motion are not of the essence.
This quiet situation was interrupted suddenly for Colonial at 11:35
A.M. on December 2, by the arrival of a registered letter from the Air
2 C.A.B. Docket No. 3964.
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Transport Board of Canada. The content was Order No. 530 which
directed:
That Colonial Airlines Incorporated do appear before the Air
Transport Board of Canada at a Public Hearing to be held in the
Board Room at Number 3 Temporary Building in the City of
Ottawa, Canada, at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of the 12th day of
December, 1949, to show cause why its License No. A.T.B. 9/46(N)
should not be suspended.
This document left no doubts over the reason for the action:
Whereas Colonial Airlines Incorporated has by action in the
Courts of the United States of America prevented the granting of
the operating authority required by Trans-Canada Air Lines to
enable it to exercise its privileges ...it would appear to be in-
equitable to permit Colonial Airlines Incorporated to continue to
enjoy the privileges granted to it ... while at the same time the
actions of the said Colonial Airlines Incorporated have prevented
and continue to prevent Trans-Canada Air Lines from enjoying
the privileges to which it is equally entitled under the same agree-
ment.
A minor international crisis followed immediately. Colonial notified
the State Department of its predicament and was told to meet all
Canadian requirements while the case would be discussed by diplo-
mats of the two governments. The airline filed an application with
the Civil Aeronautics Board to suspend service on its Canadian routes
and it informed various employees of possible lay-off. Postal officials,
connecting airlines, managers of the airports from which Colonial
operated, the mayors of the towns and cities served by Colonial, even
the governors of New York, New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania-
all received by registered mail copies of Colonial's application to sus-
pend operations. Tension increased. The show-cause hearing was
held in Ottawa, but no revocation of permit was ordered. At the
close of the meeting the President of Colonial released to the press a
statement which explained the legal aspects of the situation and then
emphasized the contributions Colonial was making toward Canada's
dollar resources in a dollar-scarce world. Opinions between the two
Governments were exchanged on the diplomatic level and apparently
Colonial's position was explained satisfactorily to the Canadians for
they never did fulfill the suggestion that Colonial's privileges might
be suspended. This successful diplomacy eased a strained situation,
but the basic problem remained unsettled.
QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AGREEMENTS
The question which Colonial Airlines put to the United States
Supreme Court concerned the whole position of the United States in
international commercial aviation.3 Our privileges abroad had been
obtained by granting reciprocal rights here through executive agree-
3 See, Lissitzyn, op. cit.
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ments in the very same way we promised to permit a qualified Canadian
air carrier to operate into New York under the terms of the bilateral
agreement of June 4, 1949. A finding that such executive agreements
were somehow unconstitutional and thus illegal could stop United
States airplanes at our borders with disastrous Tesults for our air trans-
port industry. The process of translating some forty odd executive
agreements into treaties, each requiring a two-thirds vote in the Senate,
would be interminable. The Senators ought to be busy doing many
other things and this fact alone would give those who refuse to under-
stand reciprocity a great advantage in their efforts to prevent the
granting of concessions to other countries. Some comprehension of
this confusion penetrated the thoughts of the officials. of Colonial Air-
lines. Whether the process was autonomous or encouraged by Gov-
ernment explanation is not known, but the fact is that Colonial in
February 1950 withdrew its case from the U.S. Supreme Court. The
action was explained to stockholders in the 1949 Annual Report:
Due to the increasing gravity of the international situation,
your management concluded that it would not be justified, in the
interests of its stockholders, to challenge the executive power of
the Government to make Executive Agreements with foreign pow-
ers, and to challenge, the validity of numerous Executive Air
Transport Agreements then in force. Consequently this appeal was
withdrawn.
The judicial barriers to flight were thus removed and Trans-Canada
began its Montreal-New York service in the Spring of 1950. The
difficulties of the moment had dissolved, but the whole incident served
to sharpen some of the problems in our foreign policy.
Withdrawal of this case from the U.S. Supreme Court did not settle
the issue of executive agreements, but the obvious utility of this de-
vice has been recognized through the whole political history of the
Republic. The actual issue is not the use of executive agreements
instead of treaties, but rather how Congress can direct the State Depart-
ment and the Civil Aeronautics Board in their formulation and im-
plementation of our international aviation policy. The Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 is the governing statute in this situation and the
question arises whether Congress can exert any' influence over the
exchange of air transport privileges without passing a new law. The
executive branch of the Government is, of course, susceptible to many
kinds of Congressional pressure short of the passage of legislation, yet
before Congress hurries to make changes it is correct to ask whether
changes need to be made in the method of obtaining concessions. Have
the air carriers of the United States been denied routes as a result of
poor work on the part of Government officials because they were uti-
lizing the executive. agreement technique? There is no evidence to
substantiate such a claim, and even if there were, the way out of the
difficulty would be probably some method of increasing rather than
decreasing the bargaining power of our negotiators. The record indi-
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cates considerable diligence on the part of the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the State Department in opening the world's airways to American
aircraft. They have not been able to avoid international competition,
to the vocal concern of some Congressmen, but it is hard to see how
they could have done so without generating animosity in foreign lands
at a time when our international friendships may have much to do
with our eventual survival.
UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
The major matter implicit in the Colonial Airlines affair is the way
in which the United States can satisfy internal economic pressures
without endangering foreign political and economic policies. On the
assumption that Canada has the right to fly between Montreal and
New York, or at least equal rights with the United States, it is difficult
to understand how the Canadians could be denied entry without ex-
pecting a reciprocal denial to our air carriers. This is another way of
saying that Colonial's exclusive position on the route could not be
expected to stand in the face of the realities of international relations.
If Colonial had expected competition, then all its cries of injury would
have been unjustified, but competition was not anticipated and con-
sequently Colonial took steps to protect its interests despite the fact
that it was compromising the international position of the United
States. Private economic interest usually supersedes public political
interest in our society and no amount of moralizing will produce quick
changes. It is useless to chide Colonial: what businessman would
have behaved differently? The problem is one of devising means of
compensating our industries which are actually hurt by foreign com-
petition no matter how it develops whether through executive agree-
ments on aviation, reduced tariff barriers, improved customs pro-
cedures or some other method. The idea is not to provide a continuing
subsidy which would place a never-ending drain on the public treas-
ury, but to provide assistance either in liquidating the assets or in
developing other lines of business in substitution for the activity which-
could not stand foreign competition. The possibilities for abuse of
some compensation system are many, and the development of specific
plans would be a difficult task. In the case of Colonial Airlines, the
company sought compensation from the Civil Aeronautics Board in
the form of other air transport routes. Officials of the company esti-
mated revenue diversion as high as one million dollars annually. The
1950 traffic figures revealed, however, that Colonial carried approxi-
mately the same number of passengers as it had before Trans-Canada
began its service. Any quick conclusion about cries of "Wolf" before
the beast had arrived needs to be qualified by two comments: (1)
most of the United States air carriers during 1950 experienced passen-
ger increases ranging as high as 20%, and (2) Colonial spent more
money to meet competition, notably for the purchase of new equip-
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ment' and additional advertising. Unofficial figures published by
American Aviation for the first half of 1952 (Oct. 15, 1951, p. 50) in-
dicate that Colonial is well above industry average gains in this period.
The obvious conclusion is that competition with Trans-Canada has
failed to put Colonial out of business and actually may have prodded
the United States airline to offer more attractive service to air travel-
ers. Difficulties ostensibly foreseen failed to materialize.
The simple fact that Colonial Airlines has not withered away into
bankruptcy postpones any need of solving a problem in compensation,
but it does not mean that the issue has been met. The CAB has not
granted any compensatory routes. The justice of the denial is not a
matter of concern here; the simple fact is that no redress was' made.
The statute regulating our airline industry makes provision, however,
for subsization to cover actual losses as long as these losses are not due
to inefficient operations, and consequently the Colonial Airlines affair
is not a perfect example of a compensation problem. If the Agree-
ment of June 4, 1949 actually had meant the financial ruin of Colonial
Airlines, it is reasonable to assume that the Company would have con-
tinued its efforts to prevent implementation of the Agreement as long
as possible despite the unfortunate effects upon our foreign policy.
Moreover, the response Colonial obtained in the Senate suggests that
a private corporation might overturn careful policies designed to pro-
duce'long run benefits for the United States. Contemplation of such
an unhappy development lends additional emphasis to the last sen-
tence of the Senators' letter: "We ... request ... that the agreement
be not implemented until such time as a method has been devised to
remedy damage* to United States air carriers."
* Italics supplied.
